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Abstract
Objectives: Discussions of fairness in criminal justice risk assess-
ments typically lack conceptual precision. Rhetoric too often substi-
tutes for careful analysis. In this paper, we seek to clarify the tradeoffs
between different kinds of fairness and between fairness and accuracy.
Methods: We draw on the existing literatures in criminology, com-
puter science and statistics to provide an integrated examination of
fairness and accuracy in criminal justice risk assessments. We also
provide an empirical illustration using data from arraignments.
Results: We show that there are at least six kinds of fairness, some
of which are incompatible with one another and with accuracy.
Conclusions: Except in trivial cases, it is impossible to maximize
accuracy and fairness at the same time, and impossible simultaneously
to satisfy all kinds of fairness. In practice, a major complication is
different base rates across different legally protected groups. There is
a need to consider challenging tradeoffs.
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1 Introduction
The use of actuarial risk assessments in criminal justice settings has of late
been subject to intense scrutiny. There have been ongoing discussions about
how much better in practice risk assessments derived from machine learn-
ing perform compared to risk assessments derived from older, conventional
methods (Liu et al., 2011; Berk, 2012; Berk and Bleich, 2013; Brennan and
Oliver, 2013; Rhodes, 2013; Ridgeway, 2013a; 2013b). We have learned
that when relationships between predictors and the response are complex,
machine learning approaches can perform far better. When relationships be-
tween predictors and the response are simple, machine learning approaches
will perform about the same as conventional procedures.
Far less close to resolution are concerns about fairness raised by the media
(Cohen, 2012; Crawford, 2016; Angwin et al., 2016; Dietrerich et al., 2016;
Doleac and Stevenson, 2016), government agencies (National Science and
Technology Council, 2016: 30-32), foundations (Pew Center of the States,
2011), and academics (Demuth, 2003; Harcourt, 2007; Berk, 2009; Hyatt
et al., 2011; Starr, 2014b; Tonry, 2014; Berk and Hyatt, 2015; Hamilton,
2016).1 Even when direct indicators of protected group membership, such as
race and gender, are not included as predictors, associations between these
measures and legitimate predictors can “bake in” unfairness. An offender’s
prior criminal record, for example, can carry forward earlier, unjust treatment
not just by criminal justice actors, but by an array of other social institutions
that may foster disadvantage.
As risk assessment critic Sonja Starr writes, “While well intentioned, this
approach [actuarial risk assessment] is misguided. The United States inar-
guably has a mass-incarceration crisis, but it is poor people and minorities
who bear its brunt. Punishment profiling will exacerbate these disparities
– including racial disparities – because the risk assessments include many
race-correlated variables. Profiling sends the toxic message that the state
considers certain groups of people dangerous based on their identity. It also
confirms the widespread impression that the criminal justice system is rigged
against the poor” (Starr, 2014a).
On normative grounds, such concerns can be broadly legitimate, but with-
out far more conceptual precision, it is difficult to reconcile competing claims
1 Many of the issues apply to actuarial methods in general about which concerns have
been raised for some time (Berk and Messinger, 1987; Feely and Simon, 1994).
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and develop appropriate remedies. The debates can become rhetorical exer-
cises, and few minds are changed.
This paper builds on recent developments in computer science and statis-
tics in which fitting procedures, often called algorithms, can assist criminal
justice decision-making by addressing both accuracy and fairness.2 Accu-
racy is formally defined by out-of-sample performance using one or more
conceptions of prediction error (Hastie et al., 2009: Section 7.2). There is no
ambiguity. But, even when attempts are made to clarify what fairness can
mean, there are several different kinds that can conflict with one another and
with accuracy (Berk, 2016b).
Examined here are different ways that fairness can be formally defined,
how these different kinds of fairness can be incompatible, how risk assessment
accuracy can be affected, and various algorithmic remedies that have been
proposed. The perspectives represented are found primarily in statistics and
computer science because those disciplines are the source of modern risk
assessment tools used to inform criminal justice decisions.
No effort is made here to translate formal definitions of fairness into philo-
sophical or jurisprudential notions in part because the authors of this paper
lack the expertise and in part because that multidisciplinary conversation is
just beginning (Ferguson, 2015; Barocas and Selbst, 2016; Janssen and Kuk,
2016; Kroll et al., 2017). Nevertheless, an overall conclusion will be that you
can’t have it all. Rhetoric to the contrary, challenging tradeoffs are required
between different kinds of fairness and between fairness and accuracy.
2 Confusion Tables, Accuracy, and Fairness
For ease of exposition and with no important loss of generality, Y is the
response variable, henceforth assumed to be binary, and there are two pro-
tected group categories: men and women. We begin by introducing by exam-
ple some key ideas needed later to define fairness and accuracy. We build on
the simple structure of a 2 by 2 cross-tabulation (Berk, 2016b; Chouldechova,
2016; Hardt et al., 2016). Illustrations follow shortly.
2 An algorithm is not a model. An algorithm is simply a sequential set of instructions for
performing some task. When you balance your checkbook, you are applying an algorithm.
A model is an algebraic statement of how the world works. In statistics, often it represents
how the data were generated.
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Failure Predicted Success Predicted Conditional Procedure Error
Failure – A Positive a b b/(a + b)
True Positives False Negatives False Negative Rate
Success – A Negative c d c/(c + d)
False Positives True Negatives False Positive Rate
Conditional Use Error c/(a + c) b/(b + d)
(c+b)
(a+b+c+d)
Failure Prediction Error Success Prediction Error Overall Procedure Error
Table 1: A Cross-Tabulation of The Actual Outcome by The Predicted Out-
come When The Prediction Algorithm Is Applied To A Dataset
Table 1 is a cross-tabulation of the actual binary outcome Y by the pre-
dicted binary outcome Yˆ . Such tables are in machine learning often called a
“confusion table” (also “confusion matrix”). Yˆ is the fitted values that result
when an algorithmic procedure is applied in the data. A “failure” is called a
“positive” because it motivates the risk assessment; a positive might be an
arrest for a violent crime. A “success” is a “negative,” such as completing
a probation sentence without any arrests. These designations are arbitrary
but allow for a less abstract discussion.3
The left margin of the table shows the actual outcome classes. The top
margin of the table shows the predicted outcome classes. Cell counts internal
to the table are denoted by letters. For example, “a” is the number of
observations in the upper-left cell. All counts in a particular cell have the
same observed outcome class and the same predicted outcome class. For
example, “a” is the number of observations for which the observed response
class is a failure, and the predicted response class is a failure. It is a true
positive. Starting at the upper left cell and moving clockwise around the
table are true positives, false negatives, true negatives, and false positives.
The cell counts and computed values on the margins of the table can be
interpreted as descriptive statistics for the observed values and fitted values
in the data on hand. Also common is to interpret the computed values on
the margins of the table as estimates of the corresponding probabilities in a
population. We turn to that later.
There is a surprising amount of information that can be extracted from
the table. We will use the following going forward.4
3 Similar reasoning is often used in the biomedical sciences. For example, a success can
be a diagnostic test that identifies a lung tumor.
4 We proceed in this manner because there will be clear links to fairness. There are
many other measures from such a table for which this is far less true. Powers (2011)
provides an excellent review.
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1. Sample Size – The total number of observations conventionally denoted
by N : a+ b+ c+ d.
2. Base Rate – The proportion of actual failures, which is (a+ b)/(a+ b+
c+d), or the proportion of actual successes, which is (c+d)/(a+b+c+d)
3. Prediction Distribution – The proportion predicted to fail and the pro-
portion predicted to succeed: (a+ c)/(a+ b+ c + d) and (b+ d)/(a+
b+ c+ d) respectively.
4. Overall Procedure Error – The proportion of cases misclassified: (b +
c)/(a+ b+ c+ d).
5. Conditional Procedure Error – The proportion of cases incorrectly clas-
sified conditional on one of the two actual outcomes: b/(a + b), which
is the false negative rate, and c/(c+ d), which is the false positive rate.
6. Conditional Use Error – The proportion of cases incorrectly predicted
conditional on one of the two predicted outcomes: c/(a + c), which is
the proportion of incorrect failure predictions, and b/(b + d), which
is the proportion of incorrect success predictions.5 We use the term
conditional use error because when risk is actually determined, the
predicted outcome is employed; this is how risk assessments are used
in the field.
7. Cost Ratio – the ratio of false negatives to false positives b/c or the
ratio of false positives to false negatives c/b.
The discussion of fairness to follow uses all of these features of Table 1,
although the particular features employed will vary with the kind of fairness.
We will see, in addition, that the different kinds of fairness can be related to
one another and to accuracy. But before getting into a more formal discus-
sion, some common fairness issues will be illustrated with three hypothetical
confusion tables.
5 There seems to be less naming consistency for these kinds errors compared to false
negatives and false positives. Discussions in statistics about generalization error (Hastie
et al., 2009: Section 7.2), can provide one set of terms whereas concerns about errors from
statistical tests can provide another. In neither case, moreover, is the application to confu-
sion tables necessarily natural. Terms like the “false discover rate” and the “false omission
rate,” or “Type II” and “Type I” errors can be instructive for interpreting statistical tests
but build in content that is not relevant for prediction errors. There is no null hypothesis
being tested.
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Table 2: FEMALES: FAIL(f ) OR SUCCEED(s) ON PAROLE (Success Base
Rate = 500/1000 = .50, Cost ratio = 200/200 = 1:1, Predicted to Succeed
500/1000 = .50)
Yˆf Yˆs Conditional Procedure Error
Yf – Positive 300 200 .40
True Positives False Negatives False Negative Rate
Ys – Negative 200 300 .40
False Positives True Negatives False Positive Rate
Conditional Use Error .40 .40
Failure Prediction Error Success Prediction error
Table 2 is a confusion table for a hypothetical set of women released on
parole. Gender is the protected individual attribute. As failure on parole is
a “positive,” and a success on parole is a “negative.” For ease of exposition,
the counts are meant to produce a very simple set of results.
The base rate for success is .50 because half of the women are not re-
arrested. The algorithm correctly predicts that the proportion who succeed
on parole is .50. This is a favorable initial indication of the algorithm’s
performance because the marginal distribution of Y and Yˆ is the same.
The false negative rate and false positive rate of .40 is the same for suc-
cesses and failures. When the outcome is known, the algorithm can correctly
identify it 60% of the time. The cost ratio is, therefore, 1 to 1.
The prediction error of .40 is the same for predicted successes and pre-
dicted failures. When the outcome is predicted, the prediction is correct 60%
of the time. There is no consideration of fairness because Table 2 shows only
the results for women.
Table 3: MALES: FAIL(f ) OR SUCCEED(s) ON PAROLE (Success Base
Rate = 500/1500 = .33, Cost ratio 400/200 = 2:1, Predicted to Succeed
700/1500 = .47)
Yˆf Yˆs Conditional Procedure Error
Yf – Positive 600 400 .40
True Positives False Negatives False Negative Rate
Ys – Negatives 200 300 .40
False Positives True Negative False Positive Rate
Conditional Use Error .25 .57
Failure Prediction Error Success Prediction error
Table 3 is a confusion table for a hypothetical set of men released on
parole. To help illustrate fairness concerns, the base rate for success on
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parole is changed from .50 to .33. Men are substantially less likely to succeed
on parole than women. The base rate was changed by multiplying the top
row of cell counts in Table 2 by 2.0. That is the only change made to the
cell counts. The bottom row of cell counts are unchanged.
The false negative and false positive rates are the same and unchanged
at .40. Just as for women, when the outcome is known, the algorithm can
correctly identify it 60% of the time. We will see later that the important
comparison is across the two tables. Having a false positive and false negative
rate within a table the same, does not figure in definitions of fairness. What
matters is whether the false negative rate varies across tables and whether
the false positive rate varies across tables.
Failure prediction error is reduced from .40 to .25, and success prediction
error is increased from .40 to .57. Men are more often predicted to succeed
on parole when they actually don’t. Women are more often predicted to fail
on parole when they don’t. If predictions of success on parole make a release
more likely, some would argue that the prediction errors unfairly favor men.
Some would assert more generally that different prediction error proportions
for men and women is by itself unfair.
Whereas in Table 2, .50 of the women are predicted to succeed, in Table 3,
.47 of the men are predicted to succeed. This is a small difference in practice,
but it favors women. Some would call this unfair, but it is a different kind
of unfairness than disparate prediction errors by gender.
Perhaps more important, although the proportion of women predicted
to succeed corresponds to the actual proportion of women who succeed, the
proportion of men predicted to succeed is a substantial overestimate of the
actual proportion of men who succeed. For men, the distribution Y is not the
same as the distribution of Yˆ . Some might argue that this makes the algo-
rithmic results overall less defensible for men because a kind of accuracy has
been sacrificed. (One would arrive at the same conclusion using predictions
of failure on parole). Fairness issues could arise if decision-makers, noting the
disparity between the actual proportion who succeed on parole and the pre-
dicted proportion who succeed on parole, discount the predictions for men.
Predictions of success on parole would be taken less seriously for men than
women.
Finally, the cost ratio in Table 2 for women makes false positives and
false negatives equally costly (1 to 1). In Table 3, false positives are twice as
costly as false negatives. Incorrectly classifying a success on parole as failure
is twice as costly for men (2 to 1). This too can be seen as unfair. Put
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another way, individuals who succeed on parole but who would be predicted
to fail, are of greater relative concern when the individual is a man.
Note, that all of these potential unfairness and accuracy problems surface
solely by changing the base rate even when the false negative rate and false
positive rates are unaffected. Base rates can matter a great deal, which is a
theme to which we will return.
Table 4: MALES TUNED: FAIL(f ) OR SUCCEED(s) ON PAROLE (Suc-
cess Base Rate = 500/1500 = .33, Cost ratio = 200/200 = 1:1, Predicted to
succeed 500/1500 = .33)
Yˆf Yˆs Conditional Procedure Error
Yf – Positive 800 200 .20
True Positives False Negatives False Negative Rate
Ys – Negative 200 300 .40
False Positives True Negatives False Positive Rate
Conditional Use Error .20 .40
Failure Prediction Error Success Prediction error
We will see later that there are a number of proposals that try to correct
for various kinds of unfairness, including those illustrated in the comparisons
between Table 2 and Table 3. For example, it is sometimes possible to tune
classification procedures to reduce or even eliminate some forms of unfairness.
In Table 4, the success base rate for men is still .33, but the cost ratio
for men is again 1 to 1. Now, when success on parole is predicted, it is
incorrect 40 times out of 100 and corresponds to .40 success prediction error
for women. When predicting success on parole, we have equal accuracy for
men and women. One kind of unfairness has been eliminated. Moreover, the
fraction of men predicted to succeed on parole now equals the actual fraction
of men who succeed on parole. Some measure of credibility has been restored
to the predictions for men.
However, the false negative rate for men is now .20, not .40, as it is for
women. In trade, therefore, when men actually fail on parole, the algorithm
is more likely than for women to correctly identify it. By this measure, the
algorithm performs better for men. Tradeoffs of these kinds are endemic in
classification procedures that try to correct for unfairness. Some tradeoffs
are inevitable and some are simply common. This too is a theme to which
we will return.
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3 The Statistical Framework
We have considered confusion tables as descriptive tools for data on hand.
The calculations on the margins of the table are proportions. Yet, those
proportions are often characterized as probabilities. Implicit are properties
that cannot be deduced from the data alone. Commonly, reference to a data
generation process is required (Berk, 2016: 11 – 27; Kleinberg at al., 2016).
For clarity, we need to consider that data generation process.
There are practical concerns as well requiring a “generative” formulation.
In many situations, one wants to draw inferences beyond the data being
analyzed. Then, the proportions can be seen as statistical estimates. For
example, a confusion table for release decisions at arraignments from a given
month, might be used to draw inferences about a full year of arraignments
in that jurisdiction (Berk et al., 2016). Likewise, a confusion table for the
housing decisions made for prison inmates (e.g., low security housing versus
high security housing) from a given prison in a particular jurisdiction might
be used to draw inferences about placement decisions in other prisons in the
same jurisdiction (Berk and de Leeuw, 1999).6 But perhaps most impor-
tant, algorithmic results from a given dataset are commonly used to inform
decisions in the future. Generalizations are needed over time.
In such circumstances, one needs a formal rationale for how the data came
to be and for the estimation target. In conventional survey sample terms,
one must specify a population and one or more population parameters whose
values are to be estimated from the data. Probability sampling then provides
the requisite justification for statistical inference.
There is a broader formulation that is usually more appropriate for algo-
rithmic procedures. The formulation has each observation randomly realized
from a single joint probability distribution. This is a common approach in
computer science, especially for machine learning (Kearns, 1994: Section 1.2;
Bishop, 2006: Section 1.5), and also can be found in econometrics (White,
1980) and statistics (Freedman, 1981; Buja et al., 2017).
In this paper, we denote that joint probability distribution by P (Y, L, S).
Y is the outcome of interest. An arrest while on probation is an illustration.
L includes “legitimate” predictors such as prior convictions. S includes “pro-
tected” predictors such as race, ethnicity and gender. In computer science,
6 The binary response might be whether an inmate is reported for serious misconduct
such as an assault on a guard or another inmate.
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P (Y, L, S) often is called a “target population.”
P (Y, L, S) has all of the usual moments. From this, the population can be
viewed as the limitless number of observations that could be realized from the
joint probability distribution (as if by random sampling), each observation
an IID realized case. Under this conception of a population, all moments
and conditional moments are necessarily expectations.
There is in the population some true function of L and S, f(L, S), linking
the predictors to the expectations of Y : E(Y |L, S). When Y is categorical,
these conditional expectations are conditional probabilities. E(Y |L, S) is
the “true response surface.” The data on hand are a set of IID realized
observations from P (Y, L, S). In some branches of computer science, such as
machine learning, each realized observation is called an “example.”
A fitting procedure, h(L, S), is applied to the data that contain a re-
sponse Y . The structure of fitting procedure h(L, S) could be a linear re-
gression model. The optimization algorithm could be minimizing the sum
of the squared residuals by solving the normal equations. The fitted values
after optimization are the estimates. These concepts apply to more flexible
fitting procedures as well. For example, the structure of the machine learning
procedure gradient boosting is regression trees. The optimization algorithm
is gradient descent.
We allow S to participate in the fitting procedure because it is associated
with Y . The wisdom of proceeding in this manner is considered later when
we address exactly what is being estimated. We denote the fitted values by
Yˆ . The algorithmically produced fˆ(L, S), which is the source of Yˆ , is in
computer science an “hypothesis.”
For all of the usual reasons, fˆ(L, S) will almost certainly be a biased esti-
mate of the true response surface.7 For example, some important legitimate
predictions may not be available or are measured with error, and there is no
guarantee whatsoever that any functional form arrived at for fˆ(L, S) is cor-
rect. Indeed, for a variety of technical reasons, the algorithms themselves will
rarely provide even asymptotically unbiased estimates. For example, proce-
dures that rely on ensembles of decision trees typically fit those trees with
“greedy” algorithms that can make the calculations tractable at a cost of
fitting asymptotically biased approximations of the true response surface.8
7 Formally, a richer notational scheme should be introduced at this point, but we hope
the discussion is sufficiently clear without the clutter that would follow. See Buja and his
colleagues (2017) for a far more rigorous treatment using proper notation.
8 Consider a single decision tree. Rather than trying all possible trees and picking the
10
This will invalidate conventional statistical tests and confidence intervals.
There are ways to reformulate the inference problem that when coupled with
resampling procedures can lead to proper statistical tests and confidence in-
tervals, which are briefly discussed later.
Defining a population through a joint probability distribution may strike
some readers as odd. But if one is to extend empirical results beyond the
data on hand, any generalizations must be to something. Considerations of
accuracy and fairness require such extensions because a fˆ(L, S) developed
on a given dataset will be used with new observations that it has not seen
before.
A joint probability distribution is essentially an abstraction of a high-
dimensional histogram from a finite population. It is just that the number of
observations is now limitless, and there is no binning.9 We imagine that the
data are realized by the equivalent of random sampling. We say that the data
are realized independently from the same distribution, sometimes denoted
by IID for independently and identically distributed. Proper estimation can
follow, but now with inferences drawn to an infinite population, or with the
same reasoning, to the joint probability distribution that characterizes it.
Whether this perspective on estimation makes sense for real data depends
on substantive knowledge and knowledge about how the data were actually
produced. For example, one might be able to make the case that for a
particular jurisdiction, all felons convicted in a given year can usefully be seen
as IID realizations from all convicted felons that could have been produced
that year and perhaps for a few years before and a few years after. One
would need to argue that for the given year, or proximate years, there were
no meaningful changes in any governing statutes, the composition of the
sitting judges, the mix of felons, and the practices of police, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys. A more detailed consideration would for this paper be
a distraction, and is discussed elsewhere in an accessible, linear regression
tree with the best performance, the fitting proceeds in a sequential stagewise fashion. As
the tree is grown, earlier branches are not reconsidered as later branches are determined
(Hastie et al., 2009: Section 9.2).
9 As a formal matter, when all of the variables are continuous, the proper term is a joint
density because densities rather than probabilities are represented. When the variables
are all discrete, the proper term is a joint probability distribution because probabilities are
represented. When one does not want to commit to either or when some variables are con-
tinuous and some are discrete, one commonly uses the term joint probability distribution.
That is how we proceed here.
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setting (Berk et al., 2017).
4 Defining Fairness
4.1 Definitions of Algorithmic Fairness
We are now ready to consider definitions of algorithmic fairness. Instructive
definitions can be found in computer science (Pedreschi, 2008; Kamishima
et al., 2011; Dwork et al., 2012; Kamiran et al., 2012; Chouldechova, 2016;
Friedler et al., 2016; Hardt et al., 2016; Joseph et al., 2016; Kleinberg et al.,
2016; Calmon et al., 2017; Corbitt-Davies et al., 2017), criminology (Berk,
2016b; Angwin et al., 2016; Dieterich et al., 2016) and statistics (Johnson
et al., 2016; Johndrow and Lum, K. 2017). All are recent and focused on
algorithms used to inform real-world decisions in both public and private
organizations.
All of the definitions are broadly similar in intent. What matters is the
treatment of protected groups. But the definitions can differ in substantive
and technical details. There can be frustrating variation in notation com-
bined with subtle differences in how key concepts are operationalized. There
also can be a conflation of information provided by an algorithm and deci-
sions that can follow.10 We focus here on algorithms. How those can affect
decisions is a very important, but different matter (Berk, 2017; Kleinberg et
al., 2017).
Our exposition is agnostic with respect to how outcome classes are as-
signed by an algorithm and about the fitting procedure used. This is in
the spirit of work by Kleinberg and his colleagues (2016). The notation is
arithmetically based to facilitate accessibility.
In order to provide clear definitions of algorithmic fairness, we will pro-
ceed for now as if fˆ(L, S) provides estimates that are the same as the corre-
sponding population features. In this way, we do not conflate a discussion of
fairness with a discussion of estimation accuracy. The estimation accuracy
is addressed later. We draw heavily on our earlier discussion of confusion ta-
bles, but to be consistent with the fairness literature, we emphasize accuracy
rather than error. Nevertheless, the notation is drawn from Table 1. Finally,
10 The meaning of “decision” can vary. For some it is assigning an outcome class to a
numeric risk score. For others, it is an concrete action taken with the information provided
by a risk assessment.
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in applications, there will be a separate confusion table for each class in the
protected group. Comparisons are made between these tables.
1. Overall accuracy equality is achieved by fˆ(L, S) when overall procedure
accuracy is the same for each protected group category (e.g., men and
women). That is, (a+d)/(a+b+c+d) should be the same (Berk, 2016b).
This definition assumes that true negatives are as desirable as true
positives. In many settings they are not, and a cost-weighted approach
is required. For example, true positives may be twice as desirable as
true negatives. Or put another way, false negatives may be two times
more undesirable than false positives. Overall accuracy equality is not
commonly used because it does not distinguish between accuracy for
successes and accuracy for failures. Nevertheless, it has been mentioned
in some media accounts (Angwin et al., 2016), and is related in spirit
to “accuracy equity” as used by Dieterich and colleagues (2016).11
2. Statistical parity is achieved by fˆ(L, S) when the marginal distribu-
tions of the predicted classes are the same for both protected group
categories. That is, (a+ c)/(a+ b+ c+ d) and (b+ d)/(a+ b+ c+ d),
although typically different from one another, are the same for both
groups (Berk, 2016b). For example, the proportion of inmates pre-
dicted to succeed on parole should be the same for men and women
parolees. When this holds, it also holds for predictions of failure on
parole because the outcome is binary. This definition of statistical par-
ity, sometimes called “demographic parity,” has been properly criticized
because it can lead to highly undesirable decisions (Dwork et al., 2012).
One might incarcerate women who pose no public safety risk so that
the same proportions of men and women are released on probation.
3. Conditional procedure accuracy equality is achieved by fˆ(L, S) when
conditional procedure accuracy is the same for both protected group
categories (Berk, 2016b). In our notation, a/(a + b) is the same for
11 Dieterich and his colleagues (2016: 7) argue that overall there is accuracy equity
because “the AUCs obtained for the risk scales were the same, and thus equitable, for
blacks and whites.” The AUC depends on the true positive rate and false positive rate,
which condition on the known outcomes. Consequently, it differs formally from overall
accuracy equality. Moreover, there are alterations of the AUC that can lead to more
desirable performance measures (Powers, 2011).
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men and women, and d/(c+ d) is the same for men and women. Con-
ditioning on the known outcome, is fˆ(L, S) equally accurate across
protected group categories? This is the same as considering whether
the false negative rate and the false positive rate, respectively, is the
same for men and women. Conditional procedure accuracy equality
is a common concern in criminal justice applications (Dieterich et al.,
2016). Hardt and his colleagues (2016: 2-3) use the term “equalized
odds” for a closely related definition, and there is a special case they
call “equality of opportunity” that effectively is the same as our condi-
tional procedure accuracy equality, but only for the outcome class that
is more desirable.12
4. Conditional use accuracy equality is achieved by fˆ(L, S) when condi-
tional use accuracy is the same for both protected group categories
(Berk., 2016b). One is conditioning on the algorithm’s predicted out-
come not the actual outcome. That is, a/(a+c) is the same for men and
women, and d/(b+d) is the same for men and women. Conditional use
accuracy equality has also been a common concern in criminal justice
risk assessments (Dieterich et al., 2016). Conditional on the prediction
of success (or failure), is the probability of success (or failure) the same
across groups? Kleinberg and colleagues (2016: 2-4) have a closely re-
lated definition that builds on “calibration.” More will be said about
calibration later. Chouldechova (2016: section 2.1) arrives at a defi-
nition that is the same as conditional use accuracy equality but also
only for the outcome class labeled “positive.” Her “positive predictive
value” corresponds to our a/(a+ c).13
5. Treatment equality is achieved by fˆ(L, S) when the ratio of false nega-
tives and false positives (i.e., c/b or b/c) is the same for both protected
group categories. The term “treatment” is used to convey that such
12 One of the two outcome classes is deemed more desirable, and that is the outcome class
for which there is conditional procedure accuracy equality. In criminal justice settings, it
can be unclear which outcome class is more desirable. Is an arrest for burglary more or
less desirable than an arrest for a straw purchase of a firearm? But if one outcome class
is recidivism and the other outcome class is no recidivism, equality of opportunity refers
to conditional procedure accuracy equality for those who did not recidivate.
13 As noted earlier, “positive” refers to the outcome class that motivates the classification
exercise. That outcome class does not have to desirable. We have been calling the outcome
class recidivism “positive.”
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ratios can be a policy lever with which to achieve other kinds of fair-
ness. For example, if false negatives are taken to be more costly for
men than women so that conditional procedure accuracy equality can
be achieved, men and women are being treated differently by the al-
gorithm. Incorrectly classifying a failure on parole as a success, say, is
a bigger mistake for men. The relative numbers of false negatives and
false positives across protected group categories also can by itself be
viewed as a problem in criminal justice risk assessments (Angwin et al.,
2016). Chouldechova (2016: section 2.1) addresses similar issues, but
through the false negative rate and the false positive rate: our b/(a+b)
and c/(c+ d), respectively.
6. Total fairness is achieved by fˆ(L, S) when (1) overall accuracy equality,
(2) statistical parity, (3) conditional procedure accuracy equality, (4)
conditional use accuracy equality, and (5) treatment equality are all
achieved. Although a difficult pill for some to swallow, we will see that
in practice, total fairness cannot be achieved.
Each of the definitions of fairness apply when there are more than two
outcome categories. However, there are more statistical summaries that need
to be reviewed. For example, when there are three response classes, there are
three ratios of false negatives to false positives to be examined. There are
also other definitions of fairness not discussed because they currently cannot
be operationalized in a useful manner. For example, nearest neighbor parity
is achieved if similarly situated individuals are treated similarly (Dwork et
al., 2012). Similarly situated is measured by the Euclidian distance between
the individuals in predictor space. Unfortunately, the units in which the
predictors are measured can make an important difference, and standardizing
them just papers over the problem. This is a well-known difficulty with all
nearest neighbor methods (Hastie et al., 2009: Chapter 13).
5 Estimation Accuracy
We build now on work by Buja and his colleagues (2017). When the proce-
dure h(L, S) is applied to the IID data, the resulting fˆ(L, S) can be seen as
estimating the true response surface. But even asymptotically, there is no
credible claim that the true response surface is being estimated in an unbi-
ased manner. The same applies to the probabilities from a cross-tabulation
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of Y by Yˆ . With larger samples, the random estimation error is smaller. On
the average, the estimates are closer to the truth. However, the gap between
the estimates and the truth combines bias and variance. That gap is not a
conventional confidence interval, nor can it be transformed into one. One
would have to remove the bias, and to remove the bias, one would need to
compare the estimates to the truth. But, the truth is unknown.14
Alternatively, fˆ(L, S) can also be seen estimating a response surface in
the population that is an acknowledged approximation of the true response
surface. In the population, the approximation has the same form as fˆ(L, S).
Therefore, the estimates of probabilities from Table 1 can be estimates of the
corresponding probabilities from a Y by Yˆ cross-tabulation if h(L, S) were
applied in the population. Thanks to the IID nature of the data, these esti-
mates can also be asymptotically unbiased so that in large samples, the bias
will likely be relatively small. This allows one to use sample results to address
fairness as long as one appreciates that it is fairness measured by the approx-
imation, not the true E(Y |L, S). Because it is the performance of fˆ(L, S)
that matters, a focus on fˆ(L, S) is consistent with policy applications.15
For either estimation target, estimation accuracy is addressed by out-
sample-performance. Fitted values in-sample will be subject to overfitting.
In practice, this means using test data, or some good approximation thereof,
with measures of fit such as generalization error or expected prediction error
(Hastie et al., 2006: Section 7.2). Often, good estimates of accuracy may be
obtained, but the issues can be tricky. Depending on the procedure h(L, S)
and the availability of an instructive form of test data, there are different
tools that vary in their assumptions and feasibility (Berk, 2016a). With our
focus on fairness, such details are a diversion.
In summary, h(L, S) can best be seen as a procedure to approximate the
true response surface. If the estimation target is the true response surface,
the estimates will be biased although random estimation error will be smaller
in larger samples. It follows that the probabilities estimated from a cross-
14 If the truth were known, there would be need for the estimates.
15 There are technical details that are beyond the scope of this paper. Among the key
issues is how the algorithm is tuned and the availability of test data as well as training data
(Berk, 2016a). There are also disciplinary differences in how important it is to explicitly
estimate features of the approximation. For many statisticians, having an approximation
as an estimation target is desirable because one can obtain asymptotically the usual array
of inferential statistics. For many computer scientists, such statistics are of little interest
because what really matters is estimates of the true response surface.
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tabulation of Y by Yˆ will have the same strengths and weaknesses. If the
estimation target is the acknowledged approximation, the approximate re-
sponse surface can be estimated in an asymptotically unbiased manner with
less random estimation error the larger the sample size. This holds for the
probabilities computed from a cross-tabulation of Y by Yˆ . Under either
estimation target, proper measures of accuracy often can be obtained with
test data or methods that approximate test data such as the nonparametric
bootstrap (Hastie et al., 2009: Section 8.2).
6 Tradeoffs
We turn to tradeoffs and begin by emphasizing an obvious point that can
get lost in discussions of fairness. If the goal of applying h(L, S) is to cap-
italize on non-redundant associations that L and S have with the outcome,
excluding S will reduce accuracy. Any procedure that even just discounts
the role of S will lead to less accuracy. The result is a larger number of false
negatives and false positives. For example, if h(L) is meant to help inform
parole release decisions, there will likely be an increase in both the number of
inmates who are unnecessarily detained and the number of inmates who are
inappropriately released. The former victimizes inmates and their families.
The latter increases the number of crime victims. But fairness counts too,
so we need to examine tradeoffs.
Because the different kinds of fairness defined earlier share cell counts
from the cross-tabulation of Y against Yˆ , and because there are relation-
ships between the cell counts themselves (e.g., they sum to the total number
of observations), the different kinds of fairness are related as well. It should
not be surprising, therefore, that there can be tradeoffs between the different
kinds of fairness. Arguably, the tradeoff that has gotten the most atten-
tion is between conditional use accuracy equality and the false positive and
false negative rates (Angwin et al., 2016; Dieterich, 2016; Kleinberg et al.,
2016; Chouldechova, 2016). It is also the tradeoff that to date has the most
complete mathematical results.
6.1 Some Proven “Impossibility Theorems”
We have conveyed informally that there are incompatibilities between dif-
ferent kinds of fairness. It is now time to be specific. We begin with three
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definitions. They will be phrased in probability terms, but are effectively the
same if phrased in terms of proportions.
• Calibration – Suppose an algorithm produces a score that can then be
used to assign an outcome class, much in the spirit of the COMPAS
instrument. “Calibration within groups” requires that for each score
value, or for proximate score values, the proportion of people who actu-
ally experience a given outcome (e.g., re-arrested in parole) is the same
as the proportion of people predicted to experience that outcome. As
noted earlier, this can be taken as an indicator of how well an algo-
rithm performs. But calibration can become a fairness matter if there
is calibration within one group but not within the other. There is a
lack of “balance.” A decision-maker may be inclined to take the pre-
dictions less seriously for the group that lacks calibration (Kleinberg
et al., 2016). Even if there is no calibration for either group, different
conditional use accuracy has been a salient concern in criminal justice
applications and will be emphasized here (Chouldechova, 2016).16
• Base Rate – This too was introduced earlier. In the population, base
rates are determined by the marginal distribution of the response. They
are the probability of each outcome class. For example, the base rate
for succeeding on parole might be .65 and for not succeeding on parole
is then .35. If there are C outcome classes, there will be C base rates.
We are concerned here with base rates for different protected group
categories, such as men compared to women. Base rates for each pro-
tected group category are said to be equal if they are identical. Is the
probability of succeeding on parole .65 for both men and women?
• Separation – In a population, the observations are separable if for each
possible configuration of predictor values, there is some h(L, S) for
which the probability of membership in a given outcome class is always
either 1.0 or 0.0. In other words, perfectly accurate classification is pos-
sible. In practice, what matters is whether there is perfect classification
when h(L, S) is applied to data.
And now the impossibility result: When the base rates differ by protected
group and when there is not separation, one cannot have both conditional
16 There is a bit of definitional ambiguity because Chouldechova (2016: 2) characterizes
equal conditional use accuracy as “well-calibrated.”
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use accuracy equality and equality in the false negative and false positive
rates (Kleinberg et al., 2016; Chouldechova, 2016).17 Put more positively,
one needs either equal base rates or separation to achieve at the same time
conditional use accuracy equality and equal false positive and false negative
rates for each protected group category.
The implications of this impossibility result are huge. First, if there
is variation in base rates and no separation, you can’t have it all. The
goal of complete race or gender neutrality is unachievable. In practice, both
requirements are virtually never met, except in highly stylized examples.
Second, altering a risk algorithm to improve matters can lead to difficult
stakeholder choices. If it is essential to have conditional use accuracy equality,
the algorithm will produce different false positive and false negative rates
across the protected group categories. Conversely, if it is essential to have
the same rates of false positives and false negatives across protected group
categories, the algorithm cannot produce conditional use accuracy equality.
Stakeholders will have to settle for an increase in one for a decrease in the
other. To see how all of this can play out, consider the following didactic
illustrations.
6.1.1 Trivial Case #1: Assigning the Same Outcome Class to All
Suppose h(L, S) assigns the same outcome class to everyone (e.g., a failure).
Such an assignment procedure would never be used in practice, but it raises
some important issues in a simple setting.
Tables 5 and 6 provide an example when the base rates are the same
for men and women. There are 500 men and 50 women, but the relative
representation of men and women does not matter materially in what follows.
Failures are coded 1 and successes are coded 0, much as they might be in
practice. Each case is assigned failure (i.e., Yˆ = 1), but the same lessons
would be learned if each case is assigned a success (i.e., Yˆ = 0). A base rate
of .80 for failures is imposed on both tables.
In practice, this approach makes no sense. Predictors are not being ex-
17 This impossibility theorem is formulated a little differently by Kleinberg and his
colleagues and by Chouldechova. Kleinberg et al. (2016) impose calibration and make
explicit use of a risk scores from the algorithm. There is no formal transition to outcome
classes. Chouldechova (2016), does not impose calibration in the same sense, and moves
quickly from risk scores to outcome classes. But both sets of results are for our purposes
effectively the same and consistent with our statement.
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Table 5: Males: A Cross-Tabulation When All Cases Are Assigned The
Outcome Of Failure (Base Rate = .80, N = 500)
Truth Yˆ = 1 Yˆ = 0 Conditional Procedure Accuracy
Y = 1 (a positive – Fail) 400 0 1.0
Y = 0 (a negative – Not Fail) 100 0 0.0
Conditional Use Accuracy .80 –
Table 6: Females: A Cross-Tabulation When All Cases Are Assigned The
Outcome of Failure (Base Rate = .80, N = 50)
Truth Yˆ = 1 Yˆ = 0 Conditional Procedure Accuracy
Y = 1 (a positive – Fail) 40 0 1.0
Y = 0 (a negative – Not Fail) 10 0 0.0
Conditional Use Accuracy .80 –
ploited. But, one can see that there is conditional procedure accuracy equal-
ity, conditional use accuracy equality and overall accuracy equality. The false
negative and false positive rates are the same for men and women as well at
0.0 and 1.0. There is also statistical parity. One does very well on fairness
for a risk tool that cannot help decision-makers address risk in a useful man-
ner. Accuracy has been given a very distant backseat. There is a dramatic
tradeoff between accuracy and fairness.
If one allows the base rates for men and women differ, there is immediately
a fairness price. Suppose in Table 5, 500 men fail instead of 400. The false
positive and false negative rates are unchanged. But because the base rate for
men is now larger than the base rate for women (i.e., .83 v. .80), conditional
use accuracy is now higher for men, and a lower proportion of men will be
incorrectly predicted to fail. This is the sort of result that would likely trigger
charges of gender bias. Even in this “trivial” case, base rates matter.18
18 When base rates are the same in this example, one perhaps could not achieve perfect
fairness while also getting perfect accuracy. The example doesn’t have enough information
to conclude that the populations aren’t separable. But that is not the point we are trying
to make.
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6.1.2 Trivial Case #2: Assigning the Classes Using the Same
Probability for All
Suppose each case is assigned to an outcome class with the same probability.
As in Trivial Case #1, no use made of predictors, so that accuracy does not
figure into the fitting process.
For Tables 7 and 8, the assignment probability for failure is .30 for all,
and therefore, the assignment probability for success is .70 for all. Nothing
important changes should some other probability be used.19 The base rates
for men and women are the same. For both, the proportions that fail are .80.
Table 7: Males: A Cross-Tabulation With Failure Assigned To All With A
Probability of .30 (Base Rate = .80, N = 500)
Truth Yˆ = 1 Yˆ = 0 Conditional Procedure Accuracy
Y = 1 (a positive – Fail) 120 280 .30
Y = 0 (a negative – Not Fail) 30 70 .70
Conditional Use Accuracy .80 .20
Table 8: Females: A Cross-Tabulation With Failure Assigned To All With
A Probability of .30 (Base Rate = .80, N = 50)
Truth Yˆ = 1 Yˆ = 0 Conditional Procedure Accuracy
Y = 1 (a positive – Fail) 12 28 .30
Y = 0 (a negative – Not Fail) 3 7 .70
Conditional Use Accuracy .80 .20
In Tables 7 and 8, we have the same fairness results we had in Tables 5
and 6, again with accuracy sacrificed. But suppose the second row of entries
in Table 8 were 30 and 70 rather than 3 and 7. Now the failure base rate
for women is .29, not .80. Conditional procedure accuracy equality remains
from which it follows that the false negative and false positive rates are the
19 The numbers in each cell assume for arithmetic simplicity that the counts come out
exactly as they would in a limitless number of realizations. In practice, an assignment
probability of .30 does not require exact cell counts of 30%.
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same as well. But conditional use accuracy equality is lost. The probabilities
of correct predictions for men are again .80 for failures, and .20 for successes.
But for women, the corresponding probabilities are .29 and .71. Base rates
really matter.
6.1.3 Perfect Separation
We now turn to an h(L, S) that is not trivial, but also very unlikely in
practice. In a population, the observations are separable. In Tables 9 and
10, there is perfect separation, and h(L, S) finds it. Base rates are the same
for men and women: .80 fail.
Table 9: Males: A Cross-Tabulation With Separation and Perfect Prediction
(Base Rate = .80, N = 500)
Truth Yˆ = 1 Yˆ = 0 Conditional Procedure Accuracy
Y = 1 (a positive – Fail) 400 0 1.0
Y = 0 (a negative – Not Fail) 0 100 1.0
Conditional Use Accuracy 1.0 1.0
Table 10: Females: A Cross-Tabulation With Separation and Perfect Predic-
tion (Base Rate = .80, N = 50)
Truth Yˆ = 1 Yˆ = 0 Conditional Procedure Accuracy
Y = 1 (a positive – Fail) 40 0 1.0
Y = 0 (a negative – Not Fail) 0 10 1.0
Conditional Use Accuracy 1.0 1.0
There are no false positives or false negatives, so the false positive rate
and the false negative rate for both men and women are 0.0. There is con-
ditional procedure accuracy equality and conditional use accuracy equality
because conditional procedure accuracy and conditional use accuracy are
both perfect. This is the ideal, but fanciful, setting in which we can have it
all.
Suppose for women in Table 10, there are 20 women who do not fail
rather than 10. Their failure base rate for females is now .67 rather than
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.80. But because of separation, conditional procedure accuracy equality and
conditional use accuracy equality remain, and the false positive and false
negative rates for men and women are still 0.0. Separation saves the day.20
6.1.4 Closer To Real Life
There will virtually never be separation in the real data even if there there
happens to be separation in the joint probability distribution responsible
for the data. The fitting procedure h(L, S) may be overmatched because
important predictors are not available or because the algorithm arrives at
a suboptimal result. Nevertheless, some types of fairness can sometimes be
achieved if base rates are cooperative.
If the base rates are the same and h(L, S, ) finds that, there can be lots
of good news. Tables 11 and 12 illustrate. Conditional procedure accuracy
equality, conditional use accuracy equality, overall procedure accuracy hold,
and the false negative rate and the false positive rate are the same for men
and women. Results like those shown in Tables 11 and 12 can occur in
real data, but would be rare in criminal justice applications for the common
protected groups. Base rates will not be the same.
Table 11: Females: A Cross-Tabulation Without Separation (Base Rate =
.56, N = 900)
Truth Yˆ = 1 Yˆ = 0 Conditional Procedure Accuracy
Y = 1 (a positive – Fail) 300 200 .60
Y = 0 (a negative – Not Fail) 200 200 .50
Conditional Use Accuracy .60 .50
Suppose there is separation but the base rates are not the same. We are
back to Tables 9 and 10, but with a lower base rate. Suppose there is no
separation, but the base rates are the same. We are back to Tables 11 and
12.
From Tables 13 and 14, one can see that when there is no separation
and different base rates, there can still be conditional procedure accuracy
equality. From conditional procedure accuracy equality, the false negative
20 Although statistical parity has not figured in these illustrations, changing the base
rate negates it.
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Table 12: Males: Confusion Table Without Separation (Base Rate is = .56,
N = 1400)
Truth Yˆ = 1 Yˆ = 0 Conditional Procedure Accuracy
Y = 1 (a positive – Fail) 600 400 .60
Y = 0 (a negative – Not Fail) 400 400 .50
Conditional Use Accuracy .60 .50
Table 13: Confusion Table For Females With No Separation And A Different
Base Rate Compared to Males (Female Base Rate Is 500/900 = .56)
Truth Yˆ = 1 Yˆ = 0 Conditional Procedure Accuracy
Y = 1 (a positive – Fail) 300 200 .60
Y = 0 (a negative – Not Fail) 200 200 .50
Conditional Use Accuracy .60 .50
rate and false positive rate, though different from one another, are the same
across men and women. This is a start. But treatment equality is gone from
which it follows that conditional use accuracy equality has been sacrificed.
There is greater conditional use accuracy for women.
Table 14: Confusion Table for Males With No Separation And A different
Base Rate Compared to Females (Male Base Rate Is 1000/2200 = .45)
Truth Yˆ = 1 Yˆ = 0 Conditional Procedure Accuracy
Y = 1 (a positive – Fail) 600 400 .60
Y = 0 (a negative – Not Fail) 600 600 .50
Conditional Use Accuracy .50 .40
Of the lessons that can be taken from the sets of tables just analyzed,
perhaps the most important for policy is that when there is a lack of separa-
tion and different base rates across protected group categories, a key tradeoff
will be between the false positive and false negative rates on one hand and
conditional use accuracy equality on the other. Different base rates across
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protected group categories would seem to require a thumb on the scale if
conditional use accuracy equality is to be achieved. To see if this is true,
we now consider corrections that have been proposed to improve algorithmic
fairness.
7 Potential Solutions
There are several recent papers that have proposed ways to reduce and even
eliminate certain kinds of bias. As a first approximation, there are three
different strategies (Hajian and Domingo-Ferrer, 2013), although they can
also be combined when accuracy as well as fairness are considered.
7.1 Pre-Processing
Pre-processing means eliminating any sources of unfairness in the data before
h(L, S) is formulated. In particular, there can be legitimate predictors that
are related to the classes of a protected group. Those problematic associa-
tions can be carried forward by the algorithm.
One approach is to remove all linear dependence between L and S (Berk,
2009). One can regress in turn each predictor in L on the predictors in S, and
then work with the their residuals. For example, one can regress predictors
such as prior record and current charges on race and gender. From the fitted
values, one can construct “residualized” transformations of the predictors to
be used.
A major problem with this approach is that interactions effects (e.g.,
with race and gender) containing information leading to unfairness are not
removed unless they are explicitly included in the residualizing regression
even if all of the additive contaminants are removed. In short, all interactions
effects, even higher order ones, would need to anticipated. The approach
becomes very challenging if interaction effects are anticipated between L and
S.
Johndrow and Lum (2017) suggest a far more sophisticated residualizing
process that in principle can handle such complications. Fair prediction is
defined as constructing fitted values for some outcome using no information
from membership in any protected classes. The goal is to transform all pre-
dictors so that fair prediction can be obtained “while still preserving as much
‘information’ in X as possible (Johndrow and Lum, 2017: 6). They formu-
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late this using the Euclidian distance between the original predictors and the
transformed predictors. The predictors are placed in order of the complexity
of their marginal distribution, and each is residualized in turn using as pre-
dictors results from previous residualizations and indicators for the protected
class. The regressions responsible for the residualizations are designed to be
flexible so that nonlinear relationships can be exploited. But, as Johnson and
Lum note, they are only able to consider one form of unfairness. In addition,
they risk exacerbating one form of unfairness while mitigating another.
Base rates that vary over protected group categories can be another source
of unfairness. A simple fix is to rebalance the marginal distributions of the
response variable so that the base rates for each category are the same. One
method is to apply weights for each group separately so that the base rates
across categories are the same. For example, women who failed on parole
might given more weight, and males who failed on parole might be given less
weight. After the weighting, men and women could have a base rate that
was the same as the overall base rate.
A second rebalancing method is to randomly relabel some response values
to make the base rates comparable. For example, one could for a random
sample of men who failed on parole, recode the response to a successes and
for a random sample of women who succeeded on parole, recode the response
to a failure.
Rebalancing has at least two problems. First, there is likely to be a loss
in accuracy. Perhaps such a tradeoff between fairness and accuracy will be
acceptable to stakeholders, but before such a decision is made, the trade-
off must be made numerically specific. How many more armed robberies,
for instance, will go unanticipated in trade for a specified reduction in the
disparity between incarceration rates for men and women? Second, rebalanc-
ing implies using different false positive to false negative rates for different
protected group categories. For example, false positives (e.g., incorrectly
predicting that individuals will fail on parole) are treated as relatively more
serious errors for men than for women. In addition to the loss in accuracy,
stakeholders are trading one kind of unfairness for another.
A third approach capitalizes on association rules, popular in marketing
studies (Hastie et al., 2009: section 14.2). Direct discrimination is addressed
when features of some protected class are used as predictors (e.g., male).
Indirect discrimination is addressed when predictors are used that are related
to those protected classes (e.g., arrests for aggravated assault). There can be
evidence of either if the conditional probability of the outcome changes when
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either direct or indirect measures of protected class membership are used as
predictors compared to when they are not used. One potential correction
can be obtained by perturbing the suspect class membership (Pedreschi et
al., 2008). For a random set of cases, one might change the label for man
to the label for a woman. Another potential correction can be obtained
by perturbing the the outcome label. For a random set of men, one might
change failure on parole to success on parole (Hajian and Domingo-Ferrer,
2013). Note that the second approach changes the base rate. We examined
earlier the consequences of changing base rates. Several different kinds of
fairness can be affected. It can be risky to focus on a single definition of
fairness.
A fourth approach is perhaps the most ambitious. The goal is to randomly
transform all predictors except for indicators of protected class membership
so that the joint distribution of the predictors is less dependent on protected
class membership. An appropriate reduction in dependence is a policy deci-
sion. The reduction of dependence is subject to two constraints: (1) the joint
distribution of the transformed variables is very close to the joint distribu-
tion of the original predictors and (2) no individual cases are substantially
distorted because large changes are made in predictor values (Calmon et al.,
2017). An example of a distorted case would be a felon with no prior arrests
assigned a predictor value of 20 prior arrests. It is unclear, however, how
this procedure maps to different kinds of fairness. For example, the trans-
formation itself may inadvertently treat prior crimes committed by men as
less serious than similar prior crimes committed by women – the transforma-
tion may be introducing the prospect of unequal treatment. There are also
concerns about the accuracy price, which is not explicitly taken into account.
7.2 In-Processing
In-processing means making fairness adjustments as part of the process by
which h(L, S) is constructed. To take a simple example, risk forecasts for
particular individuals that have substantial uncertainty can be altered to
improve fairness. If whether or not an individual is projected as high risk
depends on little more than a coin flip, the forecast of high risk can be
changed to low risk to serve some fairness goal. One might even order cases
from low certainty to high certainty for the class assigned so that low certainty
observations are candidates for alterations first. The reduction in out-of-
sample accuracy may well be very small. One can embed this idea in a
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classification procedure so that explicit tradeoffs are made (Kamiran and
Calder, 2009; Kamiran et al., 2016; Corbett-Davies et al. 2017). But this too
can have unacceptable consequences for the false positives and false negative
rates. A thumb is being put on the scale once again, so there can be inequality
of treatment.
A more technically demanding approach is to add a new penalty term to
a penalized fitting procedure (Kamishima et al., 2011). Beyond a penalty
for an unnecessarily complex fit, there is a penalty for violations of condi-
tional procedure accuracy equality. One important complication is that the
loss function typically will not be convex so that local solutions can result.
Another important complication is that there will often be undesirable im-
plications for types of unfairness not formally taken into account.
7.3 Post-Processing
Post-processing means that after h(L, S) is applied, its performance is ad-
justed to make it more fair. To date, perhaps the best example of this ap-
proach draws on the idea of random reassignment of the class label previously
assigned by h(L, S) (Hardt et al., 2016). Fairness, called “equalized odds,”
requires that the fitted outcome classes (e.g., high risk or low risk) are inde-
pendent of protected class membership, conditioning on the actual outcome
classes. The requisite information is obtained from the rows of confusion ta-
ble and, therefore, represent classification accuracy, not prediction accuracy.
There is a more restrictive definition called “equal opportunity” requiring
such fairness only for the more desirable of the two outcome classes.21
For a binary response, some cases are assigned a value of 0 and some
assigned a value of 1. To each is attached a probability of switching from a
0 to a 1 or from a 1 to a 0 depending in whether a 0 and a 1 is the outcome
assigned by fˆ(L, S). These probabilities can differ from one another and
both can differ across different protected group categories. Then, there is
a linear programming approach to minimize the classification errors subject
to one of the two fairness constraints. This is accomplished by the values
chosen for the various probabilities of reassignment. The result is an fˆ(L, S)
that achieves conditional procedure accuracy equality.
The implications of this approach for other kinds of fairness are not clear,
21 In criminal justice applications, determining which outcome is more desirable will
often depend on which stakeholders you ask.
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and conditional use accuracy (i.e., equally accurate predictions) can be a ca-
sualty. It is also not clear how best to build in asymmetric costs of false
negatives and false positive. And, there is no doubt that accuracy will de-
cline and will decline more when the probabilities of reassignment are larger.
Generally, one would expect to have overall classification accuracy compara-
ble to that achieved for the protected group category for which accuracy is
the worst. Moreover, the values chosen for the reassignment probabilities will
need to be larger when the base rates across the protected group categories
are more disparate. In other words, when conditional procedure accuracy
equality is most likely to be in serious jeopardy, the damage to conditional
procedure accuracy will be the greatest. More classification errors will be
made; more 1s will be treated as 0s and more 0s will be treated as 1s. A
consolation may be that everyone will be equally worse off.
7.4 Making Fairness Operational
It has long been recognized that efforts to make criminal justice decisions
more fair must resolve a crucial auxiliary question: equality with respect to
what benchmark (Blumstein et al., 1983)? To take an example from today’s
headlines (Salman, 2016; Corbett-Davies et al., 2017), should the longer
prison terms of Black offenders be on the average the same as the shorter
prison terms given to White offenders or should the shorter prison terms of
White offenders be on the average the same as the longer prison terms given
to Black offenders? Perhaps one should split the difference? Fairness by
itself is silent on the choice, which would depend on views about the costs
and benefits of incarceration in general. All of the proposed corrections for
unfairness we have found are agnostic about what the target outcome for
fairness should be. If there is a policy preference, it should be built into the
algorithm. For instance, if mass-incarceration is the dominant concern, the
shorter prison terms of White offenders might be a reasonable fairness goal
for both Whites and Blacks.22
We have been emphasizing binary outcomes, and the issues are much the
same. For example, whose conditional use accuracy should be the policy
target? Should the conditional use accuracy for male offenders or female
offenders become the conditional use accuracy for all? An apparent solu-
22 Zliobaite and Custers (2016) raise related concerns for risk tools derived from con-
ventional linear regression for lending decisions.
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tion is to choose as the policy target the higher accuracy. But that ignores
the consequences for the false negative and false positive rates. By those
measures, an undesirable desirable benchmark might result. The benchmark
determination has made tradeoffs more complicated.
7.5 Future Work
Corrections for unfairness combine technical challenges with policy chal-
lenges. We have currently no definitive responses to either. Progress will
likely come in many small steps beginning with solutions from tractable,
highly stylized formulations. One must avoid vague or unjustified claims or
rushing these early results into the policy arena. Because there is a large
market for solutions, the temptations will be substantial. At the same time,
the benchmark is current practice. By that standard, even small steps, im-
perfect as they may be, can in principle lead to meaningful improvements in
criminal justice decisions. They just need to be accurately characterized.
But even these small steps can create downstream difficulties. The train-
ing data used for criminal justice algorithms necessarily reflect past practices.
Insofar as the algorithms affect criminal justice decisions, existing training
data may be compromised. Current decisions are being made differently. It
will be important, therefore, for existing algorithmic results to be regularly
updated using the most recent training data. Some challenging technical
questions follow. For example, is there a role for online learning? How much
historical data should be discarded as the training data are revised? Should
more recent training data be given more weight in the analysis?
8 A Brief Empirical Example of Fairness Trade-
offs With In-Processing
There are such stark differences between men and women with respect to
crime, that cross-gender comparisons allow for relatively simple theoretical
discussions of fairness. However, they also convey misleading impressions
of the impact of base rates in general. The real world can be more com-
plicated and subtle. To illustrate, we draw on some ongoing work being
done for a jurisdiction concerned about racial bias that could result from
release decisions at arraignment. The brief discussion to follow will focus
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on in-processing adjustments for bias. Similar problems can arise for pre-
processing and post-processing.
At a preliminary arraignment, a magistrate must decide whom to release
awaiting an offender’s next court appearance. One factor considered, required
by statute, is an offender’s threat to public safety. A forecasting algorithm
currently is being developed, using the machine learning procedure random
forests, to help in the assessment of risk. We extract a simplified illustration
from that work for didactic purposes.
The training data are comprised of Black and White individuals who had
been arrested and arraigned. As a form of in-processing, random forests
was applied separately to Blacks and Whites. Accuracy was first optimized
for Whites. Then, the random forests application to the data for Blacks
was tuned so that conditional use accuracy was virtually same as for Whites.
The tuning was undertaken using stratified sampling as each tree in the forest
was grown, stratifying on the outcome classes. This is effectively the same
as changing the prior distribution of the response and alters each tree. All
of the output can change as a result, which is very different from trying to
introduce more fairness when algorithmic output is translated into a decision.
A very close approximation of conditional use accuracy equality was
achieved. Among the many useful predictors were age, prior record, gen-
der, date of the next most recent arrest, and the age at which an offender
was first charged as an adult. Race and residence zip code were not included
as predictors.23
Two outcome classes are used for this illustration: within 21 months of
arraignment, an arrest for a crime of violence or no arrest for a crime of
violence. We use these two categories because should a crime of violence be
predicted at arraignment, an offender would likely be detained. For other
kinds of predicted arrests, an offender might well be freed or diverted into a
treatment program. A prediction of no arrest probably could readily lead to
a release.24 A 21 month follow up may seem inordinately lengthy, but in this
23 Because of racial residential patterns, zip code can be a strong proxy for race. In this
jurisdiction, stakeholders decided that race and zip code should not be included as pre-
dictors. Moreover, because of separate analyses for Whites and Blacks, race is a constant
within each analysis.
24 Actually, the decision is more complicated because a magistrate must also anticipate
whether an offender will report to court when required to do so. There are machine
learning forecasts being developed for failures to appear (FTAs), but a discussion of that
work is well beyond the scope of this paper.
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Table 15: Fairness Analysis for Black and White Offenders at Arraignment
Using As An Outcome An Absence of Any Subsequent Arrest for A Crime
of Violence (13,396 Blacks; 6604 Whites)
Race Base Rate Conditional Use Accuracy False Negative Rate False Positive Rate
Black .89 .93 .49 .24
White .94 .94 .93 .02
jurisdiction, it can take that long for a case to be resolved.25
Table 15 provides the output that can be used to consider the kinds
of fairness commonly addressed in the existing criminal justice literature.
Success base rates are reported on the far left of the table, separately for
Blacks and Whites: .89 and .94 respectively. For both, the vast majority
of offenders are not arrested for a violent crime, but Blacks are more likely
to be arrested for a crime of violence after a release. It follows that the
White re-arrest rate is .06, and the black re-arrest rate is .11, nearly a 2 to
1 difference.
For this application, we focus on the probability that when the absence
of an arrest for a violent crime is forecasted, the forecast is correct. The
two different applications of random forests were tuned so that the probabil-
ities are virtually the same: .93 and .94. There is conditional use accuracy
equality, which some assert is a necessary feature of fairness.
But as already emphasized, except in very unusual circumstances, there
are tradeoffs. Here, the false negative and false positive rates vary dramat-
ically by race. The false negative rate is much higher for Whites so that
violent White offenders are more likely than violent Black offenders to be
incorrectly classified as nonviolent. The false positive rate is much higher
for Blacks so that nonviolent Black offenders are more likely than nonviolent
White offenders to be incorrectly classified as violent. Both error rates mis-
takenly inflate the relative representation of Blacks predicted to be violent.
Such differences can support claims of racial injustice. In this application,
the tradeoff between two different kinds of fairness has real bite.
One can get another perspective on the source of the different error
rates from the ratios of false negatives and false positives. From the cross-
25 The project is actually using four outcome classes, but a discussion of those results
is also well beyond the scope of this paper. They require a paper of their own.
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tabulation (i.e., confusion table) for Blacks, the ratio of the number of false
positives to the number of false negatives is a little more than 4.2. One false
negative is traded for 4.2 false positive. From the cross-tabulation for Whites,
the ratio of the number false negatives to the number of false positives is a
little more than 3.1. One false positive is traded for 3.1 false negatives. For
Blacks, false negatives are especially costly so that the algorithms works to
avoid them. For Whites, false positives are especially costly so that the
algorithm works to avoid them. In this instance, the random forest algo-
rithm generates substantial treatment inequality during in-processing while
achieving conditional use accuracy equality.
With the modest difference in base rates, the large difference in treatment
equality may seem strange. But recall that to arrive conditional use accuracy
equality, random forests was applied and tuned separately for Blacks and
Whites. For these data, the importance of specific predictors often varied by
race. For example, the age at which offenders received their first charge as an
adult was a very important predictor for Blacks but not for Whites. In other
words, the structure of the results was rather different by race. In effect, there
was one hB(L, S) for Blacks and another hW (L, S) for Whites, which can
help explain the large racial differences in the false negative and false positive
rates. With one exception (Joseph et al., 2016), different fitting structures for
different protected group categories has to our knowledge not been considered
in the technical literature, and it introduces significant fairness complications
as well (Zliobaite and Custers, 2016).26
In summary, Table 15 illustrates well the formal results discussed earlier.
There are different kinds of fairness that in practice are incompatible. There
is no technical solution without some price being paid. How the tradeoffs
should be made is a political decision.
9 Conclusions
In contrast to much of the rhetoric surrounding criminal justice risk assess-
ments, the problems can be subtle, and there are no easy answers. Except in
stylized examples, there will be tradeoffs. These are mathematical facts sub-
26 There are a number of curious applications of statistical procedures in the Zliobaite
and Custers paper (e.g., propensity score matching treating gender like an experimental
intervention despite the probability of being female either 1.0 or 0.0). But the concerns
about fairness when protected groups are fitted separately are worth a serious read.
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ject to formal proofs (Kleinberg et al., 2016; Chouldechova, 2016). Denying
that these tradeoffs exist is not a solution. And in practice, the issues can
be even more complicated, as we have just shown.
Perhaps the most challenging problem in practice for criminal justice risk
assessments is that different base rates are endemic across protected group
categories. There is, for example, no denying that young men are responsible
for the vast majority of violent crimes. Such a difference can cascade through
fairness assessments and lead to difficult tradeoffs.
Criminal justice decision-makers have begun wrestling with the issues.
One has to look no further than the recent ruling by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, which upheld the use of one controversial risk assessment tool (i.e.,
COMPAS) as one of many factors that can be used in sentencing (State of
Wisconsin v. Eric L. Loomis, Case # 2915AP157-CR). Fairness matters. So
does accuracy.
There are several potential paths forward. First, criminal justice risk
assessments have been undertaken in the United States since the 1920s
(Burgess, 1926; Borden, 1928). Recent applications of advanced statisti-
cal procedures are just a continuation of long term trends that can improve
transparency and accuracy, especially compared to decisions made solely by
judgment (Berk and Hyatt, 2015). They also can improve fairness. But
categorical endorsements or condemnations serve no one.
Second, as statistical procedures become more powerful, especially when
combined with “big data,” the various tradeoffs need to be explicitly repre-
sented and available as tuning parameters that can be easily adjusted. Such
work is underway, but the technical challenges are substantial. There are
conceptual challenges as well, such as arriving at measures of fairness with
which tradeoffs can be made. There too, progress is being made.
Third, in the end, it will fall to stakeholders – not criminologists, not
statisticians and not computer scientists – to determine the tradeoffs. How
many unanticipated crimes are worth some specified improvement in condi-
tional use accuracy equality? How large an increase in the false negative rate
is worth some specified improvement in conditional use accuracy equality?
These are matters of values and law, and ultimately, the political process.
They are not matters of science.
Fourth, whatever the solutions and compromises, they will not come
quickly. In the interim, one must be prepared to seriously consider modest
improvements in accuracy, transparency, and fairness. One must not forget
that current practice is the operational benchmark (Salman et al., 2016).
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The task is to try to improve that practice.
Finally, one cannot expect any risk assessment tool to reverse centuries
of racial injustice or gender inequality. That bar is far too high. But, one
can hope to do better.
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